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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with the legal issues in context of stalking behaviour and focuses on constitutional 
problems. It will give a historical background on stalking and briefly highlight to what extent changes in society 
helped to acknowledge the damage done to victims by stalking behaviour. To understand the offence of stalking a 
general overview of stalking behaviour will be given. Problems arising from anti-stalking legislation will be 
highlighted and discussed with regard to New Zealand and Germany after illustrating the way of how this behaviour 
is penalised in both countries. This paper will present the Harassment Act 1997 and the relevant provisions. It will 
then illustrate the relationship between the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) and the Harassment 
Act 1997. Freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of movement under the NZBORA might be 
affected when a court grants an order. This paper will examine how to achieve a balance between the competing 
rights of victim and perpetrator. It will be concluded that a limit to rights guaranteed under the NZBORA can be 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
Furthermore, the paper will then illustrate how victims are protected against stalking behaviour under the 
current German legislation and examine whether the existing law is inadequate and legislative changes are needed 
taking into account a new German Bill that seeks to criminalise stalking behaviour by amending the German Penal 
Code. It will be shown that legal remedies for stalking victims are not sufficient and a new criminal provision is 
needed. The paper will examine objections against the wording of the new Bill in the light of general principles of 
criminal law and will come to the conclusion that parts of the proposed provision are objectionable. This paper 
submits omitting the questionable part in order to comply with general principles of criminal law as well as the Basic 
Law. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Stalking is a complex behaviour and often includes following, harassing or threatening a 
person. The degree of obsessive stalking is only limited by the imagination of the perpetrator. 
Contrary to the popular belief that only high-profile stars are being stalked, surveys revealed that 
most of the victims were stalked by a former intimate partner. The US American 'National 
Violence Against Women Survey' unveiled that a striking 80 per cent of stalking victims were 
women. 1 Furthermore, the survey showed a clear link between stalking and domestic 
relationships as most victims knew their stalker and were more likely to be stalked by a former 
intimate partner. 
Stalking conduct mostly includes 'traditional' stalking behaviour such as being followed 
and spied on, receiving unwanted phone calls and letters or items or even being threatened by the 
death of a family pet. Sometimes, however, stalking behaviour is more bizarre. One stalker 
erected posters of his naked ex-girlfriend in a city mall, another searched through the 
complainant's rubbish bins. Another obsessive stalker searched the complainant's school bag, 
collecting hair from her hair brush, licking an apple and sniffing the crotch of her running pants.2 
While this behaviour is obviously disturbing the question has to be raised how the victim has to 
be protected. Is it sufficient to grant civil remedies such as restraining orders or is it necessary to 
frighten off stalkers by making stalking a criminal offence? 
In New Zealand, stalking behaviour is covered by the Domestic Violence Act 1995 as 
well as the Harassment Act 1997. The major difference between both Acts, as described in 
Woodman v Brooks, is that the Harassment Act 1997, in particular, is designed to protect the very 
people that cannot be brought within the framework of the Domestic Violence Act 1995, 3 
namely, those are persons not living or having lived in a domestic relationship with another 
person.4 
1 Patricia Tjaden and Nancy Thoennes "Stalking in America: Findings From the National Violence Against Women 
Survey'' (1998) U S Department of Justice - National Institute of Justice - Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention - Research in Brief, available on <www.ncjrs.org> (last accessed 12 September 2005). 
2 Examples taken from R A Swanwick ,,Stalkees Strike Back - the Stalkers Stalked: A Review of the First Two 
Years of Stalking Legislation in Queensland"(I996) 19 QUTLJ 34. 
3 Woodman v Brooks [1999] NZFLR 64, 86 Giles J. 
4 S 4 Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
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In Germany, the civil side of stalking behaviour is covered by the Civil Code 
(Burgerliches Gesetzbuch)5 as well as the Violence and Harassment Act (Gewaltschutzgesetz)6. 
A special provision, similar to criminal harassment in New Zealand, does not exist under the 
German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch ). The absence of such a provision is considered a gap in the 
system of victims' protection. Therefore, the Bundestag introduced a new Bill that focuses on 
making harassment and stalking a criminal offence. 
II HISTORICAL BA CK GROUND ON STALKING 
Stalking, like shoplifting and mugging, is a description of an offence rather than a legal category 
in its own right. 7 One might think that stalking has developed as an behavioural pattern just 
recently but despite this assumption it is not a phenomenon of modem times. 
A Stalking is not a new phenomenon 
In the fourth title of the fourth Book of Iustinian's Institutes8 of 533 it is said that "an 
injury is inflicted by constantly following a matron, or a young boy or girl below the age of 
puberty."9 In eighteen-century England, Parliament outlawed demand letters that threatened the 
receiver with arson, threatened to maliciously shoot a person, or demanded any valuable thing 
and soon expanded the law to make the sending of non-demanding threatening letters a felony as 
well. 10 The newly enacted statute prescribed the death penalty for those convicted of sending 
such non-demanding letters. 11 
5 Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch of 18 August 1896, Law Gazette of the Geman Reich 1896, 195. 
6 Gesetz zur Verbesserung des zivilgerichtlichen Schutzes bei Gewalttaten und Nachstellungen sowie zur 
Erleichterung der Uberlassung der Ehewohnung bei Trennung of 11 December 2001 , Federal Law Gazette I 2001 , 
3513. 
7 Hamish Brown "Stalking and other forms of Harassment - An investigators guide" Metropolitan Police Service 
2000, Introduction. 
8 The Institutes was intended as sort of a legal textbook for law schools. 
9 Iniuria autem committitur sive quis matrem familias aut praetextatum praetextatamve adsectatus fuerit. 
<http://www.fordham.edu> (last accessed 14 August 2005). '° Kathleen G Mc Ananey, Laura A Curliss and C Elizabeth Abeyta-Price "From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-
Stalking Law'' (1993) 68 NTDLR 864. 
11 Kathleen G Mc Ananey, Laura A Curtiss and C Elizabeth Abeyta-Price "From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-
Stalking Law" (1993) 68 NTDLR 864. 
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The first stalking case to make it into the Law Reports, however, was R v Dunn in 1840. 12 
Richard Dunn, a barrister, stalked Ms Coutts for nearly two years. He showed 'classic' stalking 
behaviour: he wrote countless letters, followed Ms Coutts wherever she went, spied on her and 
approached her in public. Alarmed by this behaviour, Ms Coutts only left the house when 
accompanied by a male servant and changed her daily patterns. Finally, she obtained a surety of 
the peace on the basis that she feared for her personal safety. After Mr Dunn was released from 
jail he resumed his stalking behaviour and, amongst others, wrote a letter stating "[i]f you refuse 
this request, you will, when it is too late, repent a course, the consequences of which will sooner 
or later fall on yourself and your family." Again, Ms Coutts sought judicial remedy. The court 
referred to the lack of an allegation of threat in Ms Coutts' writ and unanimous! y held that: 13 
Perhaps the law of England may be justly reproached with its inadequacy to repress the 
mischief, and obviate the danger, which the prisoner's proceedings render too probable; and we 
may naturally feel surprise if none of the numerous Police Acts have made specific provisions 
for that purpose. But, the power of the sessions and of the justice of the peace to make the order 
now challenged hefore us depending wholly on the words of the commission; and those words 
not being satisfied by the articles exhibited, we are bound to decide that the prisoner must be 
discharged. 
This early case illustrates the shortcomings in tackling the problem of stalking. Although 
existingjudicial remedies were seen to be insufficient as early as 1840, no relief was produced. A 
possible explanation for this situation might be a different understanding of values at that time. 
For a long time, bodily integrity was protected only if harm was already done or there 
was an imminent danger of something happening. Stalking and its impact on the victim have not 
been taken seriously and stalkers were at best seen as a distressing nuisance. Victims were urged 
to be more lenient toward the stalker as their behaviour was seen as a petty offence. In addition, 
mental or emotional distress alone, without suffering physical symptoms arising from the 
inflicted distress, was not regarded sufficient as a ground for recovery in civil law. A certain 
behaviour was also not considered an offence under criminal law as long as a certain threshold 
was not crossed and the behaviour did not amount to threatening conduct outlawed by criminal 
12 R v Dunn (1840) 113 ER 939. 
13 R v Dunn (1840) 113 ER 939, 948. 
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law. Being a complex behaviour and difficult to describe m legal terms, stalking was not 
considered a crime until the past decade. 
B Scandal promotes change 
However, the attitude towards stalking as an offence changed. Sometimes scandal 
provokes and promotes change, especially legal change. 14 This is especially true for stalking 
which has been classified as a crime category on its own only recently. Coverage of high-profile 
stalking victims has helped this offence to come to the fore. The list of celebrities who have been 
stalked seems to be endless. Steven Spielberg, Jerry Lewis, Jodie Foster, David Letterman and 
Madonna are just a few examples. For example, Madonna's most threatening and intimidating 
stalker was a man who claimed that she was his wife, and when she rejected his proposals, 
threatened to slice her throat from ear to ear. The intense media attention, that stalking and 
stalkers have attracted in the last decade due to events like the above, has generated a public 
consciousness and concern which has found political expression in a series of anti-stalking 
laws. 15 Largely as a result of agitation in the media, stalking has come to be regarded as both new 
and increasingly prevalent, requiring immediate political and legislative responses. 16 
The incident that finally set the ball rolling was the murder of upcoming American sitcom 
actress Rebecca Schaeffer in 1989 by an obsessed fan who had pursued her for two years. This 
was due to the fact that Schaeffer, a famous actress was killed, but in the aftermath of the media 
frenzy following Schaeffer's death five Californian women, all of whom obtained restraining 
orders against former spouses or boyfriends due to harassment, were killed by their former 
intimate partners. 17 
Realising a gap in criminal law and acknowledging an inadequate protection of stalking 
victims by civil means, California swiftly enacted the first criminal anti-stalking legislation 
14 Matthew Goode "Stalking: Crime of the '90s?" (1995) 19 Crim L JI 21. 
15 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 11. 
16 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 249. 
17 Kathleen G Mc Ananey, Laura A Curliss and C Elizabeth Abeyta-Price "From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-
Stalking Law" (1993) 68 NTDLR 823. 
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worldwide. 18 The media hype surrounding the phenomenon of stalking has grown to such 
proportions that many referred to stalking as the most out-of-control crime of our time. 19 State 
Governments all over the United States felt compelled to act and anti-stalking legislation has 
been fervently promoted by legislatures keen to be seen as 'doing something' .20 
C 'It's time to do something' 
This newly political activism finally acknowledged the immense emotional pressure the 
victim is being put through by the stalker and the fact that being stalked can result in life-long 
trauma. For a long time, the impact of stalking was underestimated and it was thought that, as 
long as there was no bodily harm, it was not 'that bad'. Surveys now show that stalking often has 
a deleterious effect on the psychological, social and occupational functioning of victims - most 
victims reacted with major lifestyle changes and modification of their daily activities and some 
relocated or even migrated to another country. 21 Differing from the United States where stalking 
legislation was first put in place, where the major concern was celebrity stalking, most other 
countries understood that stalking often occurs in the context of domestic violence and can affect 
everybody, not only the rich and famous. This whole process of acknowledging the ordeal of -
mainly female - stalking victims reflects the legislature's efforts to keep up with social, cultural 
and economic changes relating to all aspects of law and especially paying attention to women's 
issues. Criminal law in particular has been subject to noticeable changes as it always reflects 
changing moral standards and governmental policy. 
The German Penal Code was enacted in 1871 and, since then, experienced innumerable 
amendments. The offence of adultery as well as the offence of homosexual conduct, for example, 
has been removed in 1969. However, it at all times took extensive legal and political discussions 
- and sometimes even decades - to achieve those changes. Marital rape, for example, was not 
considered a criminal offence due to the wording of the applicable section which merely 
18 Kathleen G Mc Ananey, Laura A Curliss and C Elizabeth Abeyta-Price "From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-
Stalking Law" (1993) 68 NTDLR 821; Robert A Guy "The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws" (1993) 
46 Vand L Rev 992. 
19 Lamber Royakkers ,,The Dutch Approach to Stalking Laws" (2000) 3 Cal Crim L Rev 1. 
20 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 249. 
21 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 60. 
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penalised forced extramarital sexual intercourse. Largely, this was identified as being a problem 
and undesirable, but despite a relevant Amendment Bill that dated back to 1973, the section in 
question was changed as recently as 1998.22 Although women's issues were at least to some 
extent, albeit slowly, recognised by society, this example shows that it took a long time until they 
were also recognised by law. This process, however, was not exclusive to German law. Also 
dealing with rape and marital exemption, in the case of R v R (A Husband) of 1992 the House of 
Lords, as well as the previous courts, overturned the principle set out in Hale's History of the 
Pleas of the Crown of 1736 that a wife irrevocably consented to sexual intercourse with her 
husband on marriage.23 Their Lordships confirmed that the assumption was no longer applicable 
in modern times when marriage was viewed as a partnership of equals.24 
Adapting criminal law to changing values in society, the German legislature of 1998 
ascribed more weight to objects of legal protection such as life, prevention of bodily harm, and 
sexual self-determination than to property, falsification of documents, and perjury than the 
legislature of 1871. In addition, experiences of crime victims have just recently been recognised 
as being traumatic and the victim has become more than a witness reproducing its experienced 
physical or mental injury during criminal proceedings. 25 The German Government attached 
greater importance to strengthening victim's perspectives and experiences, especially during 
criminal proceedings, by enacting new laws. In particular, this applied to victims of sexual 
offences. Regardless of general politically motivated changes, shifts in popular beliefs added to 
these reforms. 
This briefly illustrates how social values change and influence Government policy and the 
law-making process. Stalking was identified as a problem not only to be solved by non-legal 
means but also by legal means. Legal remedies and protection in almost every country worldwide 
were insufficient to meet a stalking victim's special needs and governments eagerly embarked on 
a crusade against this unwanted conduct. 
22 Sechstes Strafrechtsiinderungsgesetz of 1 April 1998, Federal Law Gazette I 164. 
23 R v R (A Husband) [1992] 1 AC 599 
24 R v R (A Husband) [1992] 1 AC 599,616 (HL) Lord Cane CJ. 
25 Opferschutzgesetz of 1 September 2004, Federal Law Gazette I 1190. 
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III STALKING- WHAT IS IT? 
Stalking is a collective term for numerous activities that are mostly not considered 
criminal offences on their own but can, when taken together, seriously disrupt the life of the 
victim and amount to results as serious as any other crime.26 Unlike other 'normal' offences, 
stalking can be distinguished by its repetition and persistence as it might go on for several 
years.27 
Stalking generally refers to harassing or threatening behaviour that an individual engages 
m repeatedly. This includes following a person, appearing at a person's home or place of 
business, making harassing phone calls, leaving written messages or objects, or vandalising a 
person's property.28 It can be defined as a series of two or more incidents that amounted to a 
course of action causing fear, alarm or distress.29 Stalking is often closely related to domestic 
violence and to former intimate relationships gone awry. 30 In order to better understand the 
phenomenon of stalking, this paper will shortly examine different types of stalkers and show the 
immense impact stalking behaviour has on the victim. 
A Classifying different types of stalkers 
Mullen et al. classified stalkers mainly according to their predominant motivation and the 
context in which stalking occurred.31 The primary types classifying stalkers were the rejected, the 
intimacy seekers, the incompetent, the resentful and the predatory stalkers.32 The rejected stalkers 
emerge as one the commonest forms of stalking in the context of the breakdown of a close 
relationship and surveys conducted showed an average stalking duration of 38 months. The 
26 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 249 ; Lamber Royakkers "The Dutch Approach to Stalking Laws" (2000) 3 Cal Crim L Rev 2. 
27 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 58. 
28 Patricia Tjaden and Nancy Thoennes "Stalking in America: Findings From the National Violence Against Women 
Survey" (1998) U S Department of Justice - National Institute of Justice - Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention - Research in Brief, 1. 
29 Sylvia Walby and Jonathan Allen "Domestic violence, sexual assault and stalking: Findings from the British 
Crime Survey'' Home Office Research Study 276, 5. 
30 Robert A Guy "The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws" (1993) 46 Vand L Rev 994. 
31 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 75. 
32 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 75. 
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intimacy seekers, in contrast, wish to establish a loving relationship with the object of their 
unwanted attention. The incompetent suitors are often impaired in their social skills and most 
particularly in their courting skills as they seek to build a relationship by means that are 
counterproductive and terrifying. Erotomania, which is the erotic delusion that one is loved by 
another person who may not even know of the other persons existence, falls into this category 
and can be classified as a mental illness. 33 The resentful stalkers consider themselves being the 
real victim and react to an insult or injury by stalking the assumed oppressor. The predatory 
stalkers' behaviour is intended as preparatory to an assault, usually sexual, upon the victim. 
Those perpetrators are serial murderers and rapists who stalk their victims, although often not 
with the intent to make their surveillance known. 34 Those stalkers show the shortest stalking 
duration, which is an average of 9 months. The statistics clearly show how long victims have to 
take up with their ordeal of being followed, spied on and have their life and privacy intruded. 
B The impact of stalking on victims 
Because stalking is an ongoing behaviour the victim is usually exposed to multiple forms 
of harassment, the consequence of which may be chronic fear and apprehension.35 Most of the 
victims are women. 36 Female victims reported being stalked almost always by a male 
perpetrator. 37 The US American National Violence against Women Survey revealed a clear 
relationship existed between stalking and other emotionally controlling and physically abusive 
behaviours carried out in a relationship. 38 The survey assessed that about half of the female 
victims had been stalked by a current or former marital or de facto partner. About 80 per cent of 
33 Kathleen G Mc Ananey, Laura A Curliss and C Elizabeth Abeyta-Price "From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-
Stalking Law'' (1993) 68 NTDLR 832; Robert P Faulkner and Douglas H Hsiao "And Where You Go I'll Follow: 
The Constitutionality of Antis talking Laws and Proposed Model Legislation" (1994) 31 HVJL 4. 
34 Robert P Faulkner and Douglas H Hsiao "And Where You Go I'll Follow: The Constitutionality of Antistalking 
Laws and Proposed Model Legislation" (1994) 31 HVJL 5. 
35 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 58. 
36 Callie Marie Rennison "Intimate Partner Violence 1993-200 l " (2003) U S Department of Justice - Crime Data 
Brief, l ; Patricia Tjaden "The Crime of Stalking: How Big Is the Problem?" (1997) US Department of Justice -
National Institute of Justice - Research Preview, 1. 
37 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 33. 
38 Patricia Tjaden and Nancy Thoennes "Stalking in America: Findings From the National Violence Against Women 
Survey'' (1998) U S Department of Justice - National Institute of Justice - Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention - Research in Brief, 8; Patricia Tjaden "The Crime of Stalking: How Big Is the Problem?" (1997) US 
Department of Justice - National Institute of Justice Research Preview. 
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these women were, at some point in the relationship, physically assaulted by that partner, and 31 
per cent were sexually assaulted. 
Types of conduct often reported by stalking victims include harassing letters and 
threatening phone calls, repeated drive bys of the victim's house or place of work, sitting in a car 
watching the victim, following the victim down the street, and appearing at any times in any 
places.39 All this behaviour seems trivial and innocent when viewed on its own. It is surely not 
illegal to walk down the street or to sit in a parked car. But these activities taken together can 
cause fear and intimidation and are able to infringe on the victim's individual freedoms, as 
victims usually are not able to pursue their lives as they used to do.40 This paper believes that the 
legislature needs to keep abreast of contemporary behaviour in order to accurately recognise 
possible criminal behaviour. It can legislate for this type of conduct to protect the victims, their 
life, and their privacy but needs to observe the rights of the perpetrators as well. 
It shows how disturbing stalking behaviour can be and what impact it has on the victim. 
Stalking is not a harmless conduct which is not worth investigating by law enforcement agencies. 
It can destroy a person's life and career to the same extent as any other 'classic' offence, for 
example rape. Most victims of single, violent crimes develop posttraumatic stress disorders and 
the same often applies to stalking victims as well. 41 An Australian radio broadcaster and 
comedienne, who was stalked by a man with the delusional belief that she was his wife remarked 
in an interview:42 
I never wanted to tum into one of those paranoid, home-invasional type of people, but I have, and 
it's sad to be so paranoid. Being stalked would shake anyone. It depends on the individual ' s 
reaction but I just fest incapable of defending myself and I don't know why. 
39 JM Walker "Anti-stalking legislation: Does it Protect the Victim Without Violating the Rights of the Accused?" 
(1993) 71 Denver University Law Review 277. 
40 J M Walker "Anti-stalking legislation: Does it Protect the Victim Without Violating the Rights of the Accused?" 
(1993) 71 Denver University Law Review 278. 
41 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 58. 
42 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 58. 
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IV PROBLEMS RELATING TO ANTI-STALKING LEGISLATION 
Laws penalising stalking as criminal behaviour have proved difficult to draft.43 Since their 
enactment, US American anti-stalking statutes, for example, have been the source of much 
controversy. 44 Many statutes have been deemed unconstitutional by state courts, while others 
were seen as too narrowly drawn to encompass much dangerous behaviour. 45 While a swift 
legislative reaction on a loophole in the law - revealed by a spectacular incident - might 
strengthen the public opinion on protection offered by criminal law, it can also lead to 
constitutional problems regarding the wording of the statutes. 
The most common objections and critiques regarding mostly criminal anti-stalking 
legislation are the fact that the statutes' scope is considered overbroad and violates the principle 
of definiteness, and a collision with constitutional rights and values can occur. Incorporating anti-
stalking or anti-harassment statutes and remedies in civil law also leads to criticism mainly 
because of the fact that, facing the same problems as defining a criminal conduct, defining 
stalking behaviour to justify a restraining order is not easy. Also, as different rights are 
competing, proportionality has to be observed and the courts have to assess which right should 
prevail. 
A Restriction of constitutional rights 
Several constitutional rights and freedoms can be affected by anti-stalking legislation. It 
has to be examined to what extent civil and criminal provisions affect those rights. 
1 New Zealand 
In New Zealand, restriction of rights, namely granting a restraining order in respect of a 
stalker, means a possible clash with rights guaranteed to every person by the New Zealand Bill of 
43 Sally Kift "Stalking in Queensland: From the Nineties to Y2K" (1999) 11 Bond LR 145. 
44 Robert A Guy "The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws" (1993) 46 Vand L Rev 993. 
45 Robert P Faulkner and Douglas H Hsiao "And Where You Go I'll Follow: The Constitutionality of Antistalking 
Laws and Proposed Model Legislation" (1994) 31 HVJL l; Kathleen G Mc Ananey, Laura A Curliss and C 
Elizabeth Abeyta-Price "From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Law'' (1993) 68 NTDLR 906. 
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Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). In particular, a stalker's freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and freedom of movement might be affected when a court grants an order. 
Although this paper will highlight the legal provisions on civil harassment as well as 
criminal harassment, it will solely address the interaction of the provisions on civil harassment 
and their relationship to the NZBORA. This paper wants to point out how New Zealand courts 
attach importance to the rights set out by the NZBORA when granting a restraining order under 
the Harassment Act 1997. It will be discussed what, under section 5 of the NZBORA, can serve 
as a justifiable limitation of the perpetrator's guaranteed rights. 
2 Germany 
The situation regarding constitutional rights in Germany is different and the German 
Basic Law is considered to rank before every single piece of legislation. Each Act has to be 
measured upon the principles set out in the Basic Law prior to enactment. A rigid test is applied 
as to whether a new Bill meets the requirements and is a legitimate restriction of fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Basic Law. The Federal Constitutional Court formulated an elaborate 
test based on the assumption that a restriction is only acceptable where it is required and as long 
as it is vital for the public agenda.46 If the Act passes the test it will be enacted. In this context, it 
has to be noted that the Federal Constitutional Court can abolish any Act adopted by Parliament 
if it deems this Act to be incompatible with the Basic Law. Due to the doctrine Parliamentary 
supremacy, this option does not exist in New Zealand. 
The above mentioned test was also applied when enacting the Violence and Harassment 
Act. 47 Similar to New Zealand's Harassment Act 1997, the German Act might limit such 
fundamental rights as freedom of action under Article 2( I) of the Basic Law and freedom of 
expression under Article 5 of the Basic Law. Freedom of movement stipulated in Article 11 of 
the Basic Law, however, is not affected as this article only protects citizens against any 
restrictions of leaving or entering the federal territory. Freedom of action stipulated in Article 
46 Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) Judgment of 14 July 1999, 1 BvR 2226/94 
<www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de> (last accessed 20 September 2005). 
47Bundestags-Drucksache 14/5429 of 5 March 2001, Dokumentations- und Informationssystem fiir Parlamentarische 
Vorgiinge <http://dip.bundestag.de> (last accessed 30 September 2005). 
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2(1) Basic Law acts as a catchall element as it protects every person's "right to free development 
of a person's personality insofar as the person does not violate the rights of others of offends 
against the constitutional law." Therefore, the right to stay in one place and move freely to 
another place is protected under this article rather than Article 11 of the Basic Law. 
Because of these preconditions, German courts do not have to discuss every time they 
apply the Act on whether the principle of proportionality was observed when this Act was 
enacted. Bearing this in mind, this paper will not examine constitutional problems, namely 
restrictions to fundamental freedoms, which might arise from granting a restraining order under 
the German Civil Code and the Violence and Harassment Act. This paper will focus on the new 
German anti-stalking Bill that seeks to outlaw stalking and make it a criminal offence. It will be 
examined whether this Bill will be able to pass the test of the principle of clarity and definiteness 
set out by the Federal Constitutional Court. This paper will highlight constitutional problems 
connected to this legislative attempt as the Bill seeks to criminalise stalking behaviour by 
incorporating a new section to the German Penal Code. 
B Defining stalking - the wording of statutes 
Another difficulty arising in the context of outlawing stalking behaviour is the problem 
of drafting an anti-stalking statute. It is the complexity of the issue that can cause problems and 
the crux of the controversy surrounding legislation lies in the definition of conduct both 
outlawed by criminal and civil law. 48 This issue is inevitably linked to the constitutional 
difficulties mentioned before because it might affect the principle of clarity and definiteness. 
Comparing different legal systems and criminal codes, there is no uniform definition of 
stalking. Legal definitions in the United States, for example, vary widely from state to state.49 
This is due to the fact, that threatening behaviour can appear in many ways. While one 
legislature might only see the need for implementing a basic protection, another might want to 
protect victims from a variety of threatening behaviour and lower the threshold for certain 
48 Robert P Faulkner and Douglas H Hsiao "And Where You Go I'll Follow: The Constitutionality of Antistalking 
Laws and Proposed Model Legislation" ( 1994) 31 HVJL 6. 
49 Patricia Tjaden and Nancy Thoennes ,,Stalking in America: Findings From the National Violence Against Women 
Survey'' National Institute of Justice Centers for Disease Control and Prevention - Research in Brief April 1998, I. 
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actions becoming illegal. There are a number of ways in which stalking has been described and 
requirements vary and depend on the perpetrator's conduct and the impact this conduct has on 
the victim. For example, the course of conduct can be described very broadly or quite narrowly 
and the intent-requirement for committing an offence can be a high or a low one. 
This paper argues that to draft a definition fitting all individual cases is almost impossible 
given the different manifestations of stalking behaviour. Stalking is usually described by 
monster statutes defining one term after the other - and defining uncertain definitions with even 
more uncertain descriptions. 
V ANTI-STALKING LEGISLATION IN NEW ZEALAND AND GERMANY - HOW 
ARE VICTIMS PROTECTED? 
Since the first anti-stalking statute was enacted in 1990 in California, there has been a 
wide-spread movement to outlaw stalking behaviour not only by civil but also by criminal law 
means. In 1993, Canada amended the Criminal Code to cover stalking behaviour. 50 In Australia, 
the state of Queensland did so the same year and soon all other Australian states followed. 
Almost all countries followed suit and in Europe, the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Sweden have all enacted legislation outlawing stalking. 
A New Zealand 
New Zealand enacted the 'Act to provide criminal and civil remedies in respect of 
harassment', the Harassment Act 1997. The Act came into force in two parts. Most provisions of 
this Act, including criminal harassment, came into force on 1 January 1998 while provisions on 
civil harassment came into force on 1 May 1998. Although victims of stalking behaviour were 
protected to some extent by existing legislation because this legislation addressed many aspects 
of stalking, legal provisions were nevertheless considered to be incomplete. 
5° Criminal Code RS 1985 c C-46, s 264. 
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1 Relationship between Harassment Act 1997 and Domestic Violence Act 1995 
Prior to the enactment of the Harassment Act 1997, a victim of harassment or threatening 
behaviour was only able to apply for a protection order under the Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
This Act regulates for a more limited scope than the Harassment Act 1997 as it regards 
harassment as psychological abuse that is considered to be violence. 51 As pointed out by Potter J 
in Beadle v Allen, the Harassment Act 1997, in contrast, concentrates on the victim's distress.52 
Nevertheless, the Harassment Act 1997 is modelled upon the Domestic Violence Act. 
In contrast to the Harassment Act 1997, the Domestic Violence Act 1995 requires both 
victim and stalker to be engaged in a 'domestic relationship'. 53 Those victims who were not 
within the scope of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 and were stalked by a stranger, colleague or 
a mere acquaintance had to rely on the criminal or civil law for protection which neither of those 
could provide before the enactment of the Harassment Act 1997. In Woodman v Brooks, Giles J 
described the relationship of both Acts stating that "[t]he Harassment Act 1997 in particular is 
designed to protect the very people that cannot be brought within the framework of the Domestic 
Violence Act 1995; section 6(2)(b) of the Harassment Act 1997 says exactly that."54 Hence, the 
Harassment Act 1997 aims to regulate harassment within social relationships generally not just 
with respect to domestic relationships. 55 Because of this, the Act covers stalking behaviour as 
well as other threatening and intimidating conduct carried out against a person. 
2 Object of the Harassment Act 1997 
The Harassment Act 1997 has the objective of providing greater protection to victims of 
harassment by recognising that behaviour, that may appear innocent or trivial when viewed in 
isolation, may amount to harassment when viewed in context and ensuring that there is a legal 
protection for all victims of harassment. 56 This perfectly correlates with the general problems 
encountered by stalking victims. Stalking itself is not a single illegal act, but a collective term for 
51 S 3(2) Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
52 Beadle v Allen [2000] NZFLR 639, 652 (HC) Potter J 
53 S 7 Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
54 Woodman v Brooks [1999] NZFLR 64, 86 (HC) Giles J. 
55 Beadle v Allen [2000] NZFLR 639, 640 (HC) Potter J. 
56 S 6( l) Harassment Act 1997. 
17 
numerous activities that are mostly not considered criminal offences on their own but can, when 
taken together, seriously disrupt the life of the victim and amount to results as serious as any 
other crime.57 The Act aims to achieve the above object by making the most serious types of 
harassment criminal offences. 58 Moreover, the Courts are empowered to make orders to protect 
victims of harassment who are not covered by the domestic violence legislation to provide 
effective sanctions for breaches of the criminal and civil law relating to harassment. Here, the 
general idea of the Harassment Act 1997 shows: this Act is designed to complement the 
Domestic Violence Act 1995 as it covers for those victims not protected by the latter. 
Because of using the broader term 'harassment' rather than 'stalking', the Harassment Act 
1997 covers not only 'classic' stalking behaviour but all harassing behaviour such as a dispute 
between neighbours that gets out of hand. This paper is in favour of using the broader term and 
not limiting the Act to stalking behaviour as this enables the courts to provide adequate legal 
protection for every victim. 
3 Meaning of harassment 
The Act recognises two classes of harassment, civil and criminal. Both classes of 
harassment require that the perpetrator harasses the victim. This precondition is set out in 
section 3 of the Harassment Act 1997 and is fulfilled if a person 
engages in a pattern of behaviour that is directed against another person, being a pattern of behaviour 
that includes doing any specified act to the other person on at least two separate occasions within a 
period of twelve months. 
In contrast to the opinion of Tompkins Jin Bakker v The District Court of Te Awamutu,59 
Potter J in Beadle v Allen held that the two required specified acts need not occur on at least two 
separate occasions in the period commencing twelve months before filing the application as this 
would unnecessarily limit the scope of the Harassment Act 1997.60 
57 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 249; Lamber Royakkers "The Dutch Approach to Stalking Laws" (2000) 3 Cal Crim L Rev 2. 
58 S 6(2)(a) Harassment Act 1997. 
59 Bakker v The District Court of Te Awamutu (4 August 1999) HC CP 35/99 Tompkins J. 
60 Beadle v Allen [2000] NZFLR 639, 650 (HC) Potter J. 
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(a) Pattern of behaviour 
Section 3 of the Harassment Act 1997 sets out that harassment is a pattern of behaviour 
that is directed against another person. This 'pattern of behaviour' requires doing a specified act 
on at least two occasions. The dictionary meaning of the term 'pattern' is described as "a 
consistent, characteristic form, style, or method, as a composite of traits or features characteristic 
of an individual or a group: one's pattern of behaviour. " 61 This paper submits that it is not 
sufficient to commit a specified act on only two occasions to engage in a 'pattern of behaviour.' 
It is argued that this cannot constitute a pattern because a pattern requires a reliable tendency to 
carry out certain behaviour. This paper believes that the threshold set out by section 3 of the 
Harassment Act 1997 has been set to low and it would have been preferable to adopt a higher 
threshold of committing specified acts on at least five different occasions. It would then have 
been easier to refer to a 'pattern of behaviour'. Furthermore, adopting a higher threshold might 
also have made abuse of the provisions of the Harassment Act 1997 arduous. 
(b) Specified act 
The perpetrator has to engage in a pattern of behaviour doing any specified act. But what 
is regarded as a specified act able to constitute harassment? This requirement is described in 
section 4(1) of the Harassment Act 1997 and is of the utmost importance as the specified act 
constituting harassment is a requirement for the court to grant a restraining order if it deems this 
to be necessary to protect the victim from further harassment. The specified acts include 
(a) watching, loitering near or preventing or hindering access to or from a person's place 
of residence, business, employment or any other place that the person frequents for 
any purpose; 
(b) following, stopping, or accosting a person; 
(c) entering, or interfering with, property in that person's possession; 
(d) making contact with a person (whether by telephone, correspondence, or in any other 
way); 
61 Online Dictionary <http://www.dictionary.com> (last accessed 29 September 2005). 
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(e) giving offensive material to a person, or leaving that material where it will be found 
by, given to, or brought to the attention of that person; 
(f) acting in any other way that causes that person ("A") to fear for his or her safety and 
that would cause a reasonable person in person A's particular circumstances to fear for 
his or her safety. 
This extensive list explicitly covers most 'classic' forms of stalking behaviour such as 
watching and following a person or making contact with that person. Any other behaviour might 
be covered by section 4(1)(f) of the Harassment Act 1997. 
( c) The test in section 4( 1 )( f) Harassment Act 1997 
Behaviour under sections 4(1)(a) to (e) can be easily established as the wording is very 
precise and leaves little scope for interpretation. Behaviour, however, that is not explicitly 
mentioned in the list of specified acts is covered by the catchall element in section 4(1)(f). The 
components of the term 'acting in any other way' are, compared to the list, very broad and not 
defined. Differing from the list of specified acts under (a) to (e), the act under (f) requires the 
person to fear for their safety as well as that any reasonable person in the victim's particular 
circumstances would fear for their safety as well. Because of the explicit wording in subsection 
(1 ), the victim only has to fear for his or her safety if the perpetrator acted in 'any other way'. 
Fear for personal safety is not a requisite component of any specified act.62 The test under section 
4(1)(f) sets a higher threshold than the tests described under section 4(a) to (e). 63 
This paper believes that this higher threshold is, firstly, needed and useful and, secondly, 
proportional because the undesired behaviour is not as concrete as the conduct described under 
section 4(1)(a) to (e) and therefore the standard has to be different. The perpetrator might not 
know that the behaviour he or she engages in will subjectively be experienced as harassment by 
the victim. Therefore, it is necessary to not only apply a subjective test based on the victim's 
perception of the behaviour but also to apply an objective test. It has to be determined whether 
'acting in any other way' would cause a reasonable person in the victim's particular 
62 Beadle v Allen [2000] NZFLR 639, 647 (HC) Potter J. 
63 C v G [1998] DCR 805 Judge Shaw. 
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circumstances to fear for his or her safety. This objective requirement serves as regulative 
component in order to protect a possible perpetrator of an oversensitive or overreacting victim. 
Surely, the most important objective of the Harassment Act 1997 is to protect the victim. But 
also the perpetrator's rights have to be taken into account when determining whether an act 
constitutes a specified act under the Act. There is always the possibility of an over-reacting 
victim seeking protection by legal means and dragging an innocent person in front of the court. 
The importance of a combined objective and subjective test under section 4(1)(f) shall be 
presented by an exaggerated example. To meet the requirements set out under section 4(1)(f) it 
would, for example, be sufficient to send another person a bunch of flowers twice in twelve 
months as this has to be considered acting in 'any other way' not described in 4(1)(a) to (e). 
Some people might be flattered, some might find it an act of friendship, others might call it 
harassment and feel threatened. This shows the need for an objective regulation when 
determining specified acts that are committed in 'any other way'. Would a reasonable person fear 
for his or her safety when send two bunches of flowers in a one-year period? If there are no other 
acts committed by the perpetrator this behaviour would definitely not be regarded as sufficient to 
constitute a specified act under section 4(1)(f). Once again, the objective of the Harassment Act 
1997 is shown. This is the aim of ensuring an adequate legal protection for every victim. 
Protection should never be disproportionate and abusive of rights. 
( d) When does stalking behaviour amount to harassment? 
Stalking behaviour is sometimes bizarre. In an example, Swanwick stated that one 
obsessive stalker searched the appellant's school bag, collecting hair from her hair brush, licking 
an apple and sniffing the crotch of her running pants.64 This behaviour is disturbing but can it 
also justify a restraining order? The question arises when stalking behaviour crosses the line and 
amounts to harassment. This paper believes that a certain threshold has to be reached to intervene 
by legal means. This is the fundamental idea of the concept of law. Society has to keep up with 
confused people and frustrated suitors to some extent. Nevertheless, an intrusion into people's 
life and privacy cannot be accepted when it amounts to disturbance and curtails the life and 
64 R A Swanwick ,,Stalkees Strike Back - the Stalkers Stalked: A Review of the First Two Years of Stalking 
Legislation in Queensland"(J996) 19 QUTLJ 34. 
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freedom of the person affected. Here, the law must intervene. But by doing so, a fair balance has 
to be achieved and competing rights have to be assessed and weighed up against each other. The 
principle of proportionality has to be strictly observed. 
4 Criminal Harassment 
Criminal harassment under section 8 of the Harassment Act 1997 is an offence. This 
section reads as follows: 
8 Criminal harassment 
(1) Every person commits an offence who harasses another person in any case where--
(a) The first-mentioned person intends that harassment to cause that other person to 
fear for-
(i) That person's safety; or 
(ii) The safety of any person with whom that other person IS m a family 
relationship; or 
(b) The first-mentioned person knows that the harassment is likely to cause the other 
person, given his or her particular circumstances, to reasonably fear for--
(i) That person's safety; or 
(ii) The safety of any person with whom that other person IS m a family 
relationship. 
(2) Every person who commits an offence against this section is liable, on summary 
conviction, to imprisonment not exceeding 2 years. 
"Safety" is defined to include a person's "mental well-being" although the Harassment 
Act 1997 comprises no guidance on how to define this term. 65 This paper argues that this 
prerequisite is difficult to define as it is comprises a broad outcome. In Durkin v Police Williams 
J noted that the criminal harassment provisions were not at all easy to construe or to apply, that 
by reason of the extended meaning given to 'safety' by section 2, Parliament did not intend that 
safety should be confined solely to physical safety and that the Harassment Act 1997 still is a 
65 S 2(1) Harassment Act 1997. 
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largely untried statute.66 The possible outcome of stalking behaviour is almost unlimited and can 
range from distress to a severe psychological trauma. So far, there are no judicial guidelines on 
how to define 'fear of safety' in regard of mental well-being and to identify its scope. This is, 
however, of vital importance for determining whether or not there has been criminal or civil 
harassment. In Beadle v Allen Potter J tried to find an explanation on the applicability of this 
requirement.67 Potter J sought to compare 'fear for a person's safety' under the Harassment Act 
1997 with the notion of fear for personal safety which is implied under the Domestic Violence 
Act 1995. It has been held that those two definitions cannot be compared as they are deliberately 
distinct because they derive from Acts that differ significantly.68 
Under section 8 of the Harassment Act 1997, a person can be harassed either with intent 
or recklessly. First, both alternatives, of course, require a determination whether the accused 
committed harassment, namely a specified act under section 4(l)(a) to (t). Then it has to be 
established whether the accused intended harassing the victim to cause the victim fear for his or 
her safety or whether the accused knew that the harassment was likely to cause the victim 
reasonable fear for his or her safety. 
(a) Section 8(l)(a) Harassment Act 1997 
Differing from section 8(l)(b), the victim does not need to reasonably fear for his or her 
safety. If the perpetrator acted with intent, it is sufficient under this subsection that the outcome 
of this act was the victim's fear for his or her safety as this was the perpetrators main motivation 
to act. In this context, the issue arises as to how it can be proved that a person, for example, 
drove past their acquaintance's house repeatedly to cause this other person fear? This paper 
believes that the facts constituting a specified act under section 4(1) have to be evaluated and 
assessed upon their severity. The more threatening a certain conduct will be viewed by courts, 
the better the possibility of determining the intent to cause the victim to fear for his or her safety. 
For example, sending a letter containing bullets might more easily allow the conclusion that the 
perpetrator acted with intent to cause fear. 
66 Durkin v Police (8 September 1999) HCA 106/99, 17 Williams J. 
67 Beadle v Allen [2000] NZFLR 639, 653 (HC) Potter J. 
68 Beadle v Allen [2000] NZFLR 639, 653 (HC) Potter J. 
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(b) Section 8(1 )(b) Harassment Act 1997 
Section 8(1 )(b) Harassment Act 1997 makes harassment an offence if the perpetrator 
knows that the harassment is likely to cause the other person, given the person's particular 
circumstances. Pointing out the immanent difficulty of stalking legislation, Potter J stated that: 
Great concern has been expressed by commentators about defining acts of stalking and of the 
dangers that behaviour innocent on the surface, may in fact be innocent but be interpreted as 
stalking. However, commentators generally agree that legislation for the offence of stalking needs to 
be widely drawn in order to be effective. Universally it has proved very difficult to draw legislation 
widely enough to include all relevant situations whilst at the same time limiting the operation of the 
legislation to the desired target groups. In New Zealand many apparently innocuous activities can 
constitute a "specified act" for the purposes of the Act. A requirement of only two specified acts over 
a period of 12 months means that there is the potential for innocent persons to be caught in its net. 
On the other hand legislation too narrowly drawn would exclude situations not covered by existing 
legislation and for which the Act was specifically designed. 
An example for how courts can sometimes be at a loss with certain new provisions is 
R v D. 69 This case illustrates a misunderstanding of the Harassment Act 1997 and was therefore 
considered a "miscarriage of justice" by Elias CJ in the Court of Appeal. 70 
Briefly summarised, the facts of the case were as follows: the appellant (the 'stalker') fell 
in love with the complainant (the 'victim') but her feelings were not returned. After an argument 
the complainant received a letter from the appellant which the appellant considered to be a rape 
threat. The Court of Appeal had to decide whether the appellant under section 8(1)(b) of the 
Harassment Act 1997 had knowledge that her actions, sending the letter and calling the 
complainant, were likely to cause the complainant, given her personal circumstances, to 
reasonably fear for her safety. The appellant was convicted to six months' imprisonment, 
suspended for a period of 12 months by the District Court and her appeal to the High Court was 
dismissed. She was of the opinion that, in both the District and High Court, the judges 
misconstrued the statutory provisions and that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The appeal 
was allowed and the conviction quashed. The Court of Appeal stated that there was no evidence 
69 R v D [2000] 2 NZLR 641 (CA) Elias CJ. 
70 R v D [2000] 2 NZLR 641, 655 (CA) Elias CJ. 
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to suggest that the appellant was or should have been aware that her contact with the complainant 
was causing the complainant any distress. 71 
This paper believes that the judgments of both the District Court and High Court show no 
understanding of the Harassment Act 1997, its objective and provisions and it appears that they 
even lack the most basic principles of criminal law. 
Firstly, Elias CJ pointed out that Williams J, in the High Court, was of the view that the . 
relationship between section 4(1)(f) and section 8(1)(b) is a difficult one because section 4(1)(f) 
imposes on objective standard whereas section 8(1)(b) requires the accused to know that the 
harassment is likely to cause the other person, given his or her particular circumstances, to 
reasonably fear for the person's safety. 72 Elias CJ correctly observed that the two tests in both 
sections are directed at separate inquiries. 73 
This paper argues that this is almost self explanatory, as section 4(1)(f) provides the 
constituents of harassment and determines what the Harassment Act 1997 actually qualifies as 
being a specified act. When determining which behaviour shall be liable for prosecution, the 
starting point always has to be an objective one. Otherwise, no one would ever know which 
conduct is considered legal and which is considered illegal. One can definitely not peek into the 
victim's mind. The offence of criminal harassment concerns behaviour that is highly subjective 
and difficult to manifest as its culpability results from the victim's fear and distress. Therefore, 
there has to be an objective requirement to curtail unrestricted application when establishing 
whether there has been a 'specified act'. This objective requirement is the 'reasonable person' 
test. Elias CJ held that "since section 4(1 )(f) is a provision designed to catch unusual acts outside 
the categories identified in section 4(1)(a) to (e), some qualitative restriction [ ... ] was clearly 
thought by Parliament to be necessary."74 This paper agrees with those findings. In contrast, 
section 8(1 )(b) requires a test to determine the knowledge of the perpetrator about the behaviour 
and its impact on the victim. Both requirements differ considerably from each other and cannot 
be mixed together. 
71 R v D [2000] 2 NZLR 641, 651 (CA) Elias CJ. 
72 R v D [2000] 2 NZLR 641 , 646 (CA) Elias CJ. 
73 R v D [2000] 2 NZLR 641, 646 (CA) Elias CJ. 
74 R v D [2000] 2 NZLR 641, 646 (CA) Elias CJ. 
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Further, the District Court decision shows fundamental errors in reasoning and clearly 
shows the lack of understanding of the most basic principles of criminal law. The existence of the 
required knowledge under section 8(1 )(b) always has to be assessed for the time of each 
'specified act'. The correlation of act and intent is one of the fundamental principles of criminal 
law. Nevertheless, the judges both in the District Court and the High Court did not assess the 
incidents at the time they occurred but simply considered them to be 'specified acts' under the 
Harassment Act 1997. Elias CJ addressed this by stating that: 75 
It is not sufficient to conclude, as the High Court Judge did, that 'there was ample evidence from 
which the learned District Court Judge could conclude that all the elements of the charge under 
section 8(l)(b) had been made out, notwithstanding his lack of expressed reference to the 
complainant's circumstances.' 
The case of R v D shows, how behaviour, although not being innocent but also clearly not 
being serious enough to be considered criminal conduct punishable with imprisonment, can be 
seen as being 'the most serious type of harassment' in regard to section 6 of the Harassment Act 
1997 and constitute a criminal offence. This paper views the constituents 'knowledge' and 'given 
his or her particular circumstances' under section 8(1 )(b) highly problematic ones. Criminal 
judges have to be careful when applying this provision and should never lose sight of the overall 
objects of the Harassment Act 1997. Not every behaviour can be seen as 'the most serious type 
of harassment' and the tests set out in sections 4 and 8 have to be strictly adhered to in order to 
avoid repeating making mistakes such as in R v D. 
5 Civil Harassment 
Where the necessary elements of intent or know ledge are not present there is no criminal 
aspect, but the person being stalked may apply for a restraining order under s 9 of the 
Harassment Act 1997. When stalking behaviour amounts to civil harassment, a court may make a 
restraining order under section 16 of the Harassment Act 1997. Section 16 provides: 
75 R v D [2000] 2 NZLR 641, 655 (CA) Elias CJ. 
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16 Power to make a restraining order 
(1) [ ... ] [T]he Court may make a restraining order if it is satisfied that -
(a) The respondent has harassed, or is harassing, the applicant; and 
(b) The following requirements are met: 
(i) The behaviour in respect of which the application is made causes the 
applicant distress, or threatens to cause the applicant distress; and 
(ii) That behaviour would cause distress, or would threaten to cause distress, 
to a reasonable person in the applicant's particular circumstances; and 
(iii)In all the circumstances, the degree of distress caused or threatened by that 
behaviour justifies the making of an order; and 
(c) The making of an order is necessary to protect the applicant from further 
harassment. 
In Irvine v Edwards, Judge Kerr correctly observed that the word 'may' indicates that it is 
in the court's discretion to decide whether or not a restraining order will be granted. 76 This paper 
agrees with this conclusion as the wording of the section clearly stipulates the court's discretion. 
(a) The prerequisite of harassment 
According to section 9 of the Harassment Act 1997 any person who is being or has been 
harassed by another person may apply to the court for a restraining order in respect of this other 
person. First of all, it has to be established whether the objectionable behaviour constitutes 
harassment. As clearly stated, this requirement not only applies for persons who are still being 
harassed but also for victims who have been harassed in the past. This will be the case if the 
behaviour can be qualified as a specified act under section 4 of the Harassment Act 1997.77 
76 Irvine v Edwards [ 1999] DCR 171 Judge Kerr. 
77 S 9(1) Harassment Act 1997. 
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(b) Requirements to grant a restraining order 
Section 16 sets out the requirements when the court may grant such an order. All of the 
requirements have to be established in combination by the court. This is indicated by using the 
word 'and' at the end of each sentence. 
(i) Harassing behaviour causes the applicant distress or threatens to cause distress 
Furthermore, this harassing behaviour is required to cause the applicant distress, or threat 
to cause the applicant distress. It is of course necessary that the victim is still distressed or 
threatened to be distressed even if the harassing behaviour has already stopped. Otherwise, a 
restraining order would be of no use and could not be regarded as proportionate with respect to 
the respondent's rights. Restraining the respondent's rights cannot be lawful when there is 
actually no distress the victim is suffering from. A restraining order is a legal remedy, not a 
punishment for the perpetrator, and because of this, it always has to be tied up with the current 
situation. This requirement adds a subjective constituent of the provision because only the 
victim's view of the conduct is important. This component correlates with the subjective 
requirement of fear for safety under section 4(1 )(f)(i) although there is no requirement under 
section 16 that the applicant fears for his or her personal safety. 78 
It is necessary that the subjective requirement is restricted by an objective requirement. 
Otherwise a restraining order could be immediately granted to the most sensible victim who is 
distressed easily even if this distress is irreproducible for a reasonable person examining the 
behaviour from a non-victim's perspective. 
(ii) Behaviour would cause distress to a reasonable person 
The Harassment Act 1997 stipulates an objective requirement as it requests that "that 
behaviour would cause distress, or would threaten to cause distress, to a reasonable person in the 
applicant's particular circumstances."79 This prerequisite is needed to restrict the wide scope 
78 Beadle v Allen [2000] NZFLR 639, 640 (HC) Potter J. 
79 S 16(l)(b)(ii) Harassment Act 1997. 
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opened up by the subjective requirement stated above. It would be not proportionate to enable the 
court to restrict the respondent's rights just because of the victim's view of the respondent's 
behaviour. This could lead to false accusations and would not protect the respondent's rights. In 
C v G, Judge Shaw clearly stated that it was not enough that a person was angered, annoyed or 
upset to grant the remedy set out in the Harassment Act 1997.80 Intimidating glances, exchanged 
at a party, cannot justify a restraining order. 
(iii) Degree of distress justifies making a restraining order 
This requirement is the most judgmental because the court has to assess the degree of 
distress caused or threatened by the behaviour in all circumstances of the case. As Potter J in 
Beadle v Allen put it, "this is the [ criterion] under the Act for the exercise of the Court's 
discretion to a restraining order once a specified act has been established." 81 The degree of 
distress has to be sufficient and has to justify the making of a restraining order. Determining this 
component under section 16, the court has to carefully balance competing rights and freedoms of 
the appellant as well as the respondent. In this context, rights guaranteed by the NZBORA have 
to be observed and evaluated. 
(iv) Restraining order must be necessary 
Under section 16(1)(c) of the Harassment Act 1997, the making of an order must be 
necessary to protect the applicant from further harassment. This requirement demands from the 
court to use restraining orders only if there are no other measures available to protect the victim. 
A restraining order is an intrusion in the perpetrator' s rights and freedoms and should always be 
used carefully. In E v O Judge Hole stated that the Court must bear in mind all the circumstances 
of the case and determine if the degree of distress experienced by the applicant justifies the 
making of an order, and that the intrusion on rights and freedoms must be so limited only to the 
extent necessary to protect the victim of harassment.82 When it comes to the question whether or 
8° C v G [1998] DCR 805, 806 Judge Shaw. 
81 Beadle v Allen [2000] NZFLR 639, 653 (HC) Potter J. 
82 E v O [2004] DCR 281 , 287 Judge Hole. 
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not to grant a restraining order, this paper agrees with Judge Shaw who stated in C v G that "the 
Harassment Act and in particular the provision relating to the issuing of restraining orders must 
be interpreted with a degree of common sense."83 
( c) Effects of restraining orders 
A restraining order may be made for such a period as the court considers necessary to 
protect the victim from further harassment. 84 This period of time will usually be one year but it 
can be made for a longer or shorter period as the court considers it necessary to protect the 
victim. If the order is breached by the respondent, this is considered an offence under section 25 
of the Harassment Act 1997. 
( d) Balance of competing rights - NZBORA and Harassment Act 1997 
As stated above, the requirement of the 'degree of distress' is the indicator as to whether 
or not a restriction to rights and freedoms might be justifiable. When granting a restraining order, 
the court will inevitably restrict the respondent's rights. Beadle v Allen vividly shows the effects 
of the Harassment Act 1997 on rights and freedoms guaranteed in a free and democratic society. 
Potter J extensively considered the effect of the NZBORA on the Harassment Act 1997.85 In 
addition, Judge Hole in E v O held that it is the purpose of the Act is to restrict freedom of 
expression to the extent necessary to provide protection for the victims of harassment. 86 
In particular, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of movement 
under the NZBORA might be affected when a court grants an order. A restraining order under 
the Harassment Act 1997 has to comply with the principles, rights and freedoms set out by the 
NZBORA. In considering what a justifiable limitation on the perpetrator's freedoms is, it is 
necessary as in all cases where there is a conflict between competing rights and freedoms, to 
balance the competing rights. 87 
83 C v G [1998] DCR 805, 808 Judge Shaw. 
84 S 21 Harassment Act 1997. 
85 Beadle v Allen [2000] NZFLR 639, 653 (HC) Potter J. 
86 E v O [2004] DCR 281, 287 Judge Hole. 
87 Beadle v Allen [2000] NZFLR 639, 653 (HC) Potter J. 
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Section 5 NZBORA recognises explicitly that there are limits on guaranteed rights and 
freedoms as it stipulates that "[ ... ] the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may 
be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society." In Ministry of Transport v Noort, Richardson J held that "[i]t 
reflects the reality that rights do not exist in a vacuum and that they may be modified in the 
public interest to take account of the rights of others and of the interests of the whole 
community."88 
Therefore, the most important issue is to determine if the protection afforded by the 
Harassment Act 1997 is justifiable in a free and democratic society. 89 The question is whether the 
degree of restraint is reasonably justifiable to protect the victim but, at the same time, curtails as 
little as possible the rights and freedoms of the perpetrator.90 In section 17, the Harassment Act 
1997 itself already contains a provision to help balance the victim's and the perpetrator's rights 
as harassment cannot be established if the specified act was done for a lawful purpose. 
The decision of Parliament to implement the Harassment Act 1997 was carried by the 
intention to provide a remedy for people who are subject to obsessive behaviour by other persons 
and for whom no satisfactory legal remedies are otherwise available. The Act was designed to 
provide adequate legal protection for all victims. By vesting the courts with the possibility to 
grant restraining orders and making the most serious types of harassment a criminal offence, 
Parliament reached a decision of valuing the rights of victims higher than the rights and freedoms 
of perpetrators. The victim has the right to be left alone, live in solitude and seclusion and not 
have their privacy intruded. Although those rights are not explicitly established under the 
NZBORA, this paper believes that they have to have the same importance as the perpetrator's 
freedom of expression or movement. 
In E v O Judge Hole was of the opinion that, in the context of freedom of expression, the 
problem was not so much in the fact that the perpetrator has sought to express certain opinions 
but more in the way it was done. By using offensive language and by distributing material as 
often and as widely as the perpetrator has, the line from mere expression of opinion to 
88 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260,283 (CA) Richardson J. 
89 E v O [2004] DCR 281,287 Judge Hole. 
90 E v O [2004] DCR 281,287 Judge Hole. 
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harassment was crossed.91 In B v Reardon, referring to freedom of expression, Judge Robinson, 
however, held in that the defence of truth and honest opinion must also apply under the 
Harassment Act 1997. He stated that acts cannot constitute harassment if they are justified and a 
publication, for example, could not be prevented by the granting of an injunction under the 
existing law with regard to defamation.92 This paper contends that by stating these underlying 
principles, it becomes clear that protection under the Harassment Act 1997 should not contravene 
existing law and has to be balanced against the perpetrator's rights. 
The victim's distress caused by behaviour protected under the NZBORA has to reach a 
level where the purpose of the Harassment Act 1997 kicks in, which is to restrict rights and 
freedoms to the extent necessary to provide protection for the victims of harassment. The 
protection of harassment victims from behaviour that might appear innocent or trivial when 
viewed in isolation but amount to harassment when viewed in context is a legitimate intention 
and is in the public interest. 
This paper argues that, to eliminate an abusive use of legal protection by granting 
restraining orders, a stringent application of the provisions set out under the Harassment Act 
1997 has to take place. The courts must especially pay attention to all circumstances of the case 
in deciding whether the degree of distress experienced by the victim justifies making a 
restraining order. They have to evaluate competing rights carefully, be aware of the most 
judgmental requirement and assess the degree of distress caused or threatened by the behaviour 
in all circumstances of the case. Furthermore, the duration of a restraining order will normally be 
one year.93 This requirement can also secure that a restriction of rights will only be made to an 
extent and for a period of time necessary to protect the victim. Of course, the longer the period of 
restriction for the perpetrator, the more accurate the reasoning and balancing of competing rights 
has to be. It might be reasonable to restrict the perpetrator' s rights for six months or a year, but 
the test has to be more strictly applied there longer a restraining order is valid. The balance of 
competing rights certainly has to be a different, the impact on the victim more intense and no 
other means available if an order would be granted for five years. 
9 1 E v O [2004] DCR 281 , 287 Judge Hole. 
92 B v Reardon [2000] DCR 575, 581 Judge Robinson. 
93 S 21 Harassment Act 1997. 
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Therefore, the Harassment Act 1997 can of course limit certain rights and freedoms 
under the NZBORA. As each other Act enacted by Parliament, this Act will inevitably contain an 
assessment of values and protective measures. In order to comply with the Parliamentary 
objectives and guidelines the intrusion of rights and freedoms should be so limited as to impinge 
only the extent necessary to protect a victim of harassment as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society. 
B Germany 
German stalking victims must rely on criminal or civil law for protection. Compared to 
the previous situation in other countries before the enactment of new anti-stalking legislation, 
whether civil or criminal, Germany faces the same difficulties in tackling this problem. 
Following the general trend in most European countries, a new Bill on stalking was introduced 
into the Bundestag in April 2005. So far, there has been no ruling on this proposal to amend the 
law. The intention of the legislature is to make stalking behaviour a criminal conduct under the 
German Penal Code, comparable with criminal harassment under section 8 of the Harassment 
Act 1997. 
Civil remedies against stalking have been available under section 823 in connection with 
section 1004 of the Civil Code since the enactment of this code in the year 1900, but it has to be 
noted that this protection was merely a side effect of the general protection from intrusion 
guaranteed by this special section. This was one of the main reasons why Government sought to 
improve existing remedies by enacting the Violence and Harassment Act. This Act was passed as 
a result of the new 'Plan of Action on the Combat of Violence against Women' which the 
Government agreed on at the end of 1999.94 The main aim of this 'Plan of Action' is to ensure a 
tighter cooperation of Government agencies in order to improve the combat against violence 
against women and make sure legislative changes will not only produce isolated relief but help to 
tackle the problem of violence against women in its complexity. 
94 "Aktionsplan der Bundesregierung zur Bekampfung von Gewalt gegen Frauen" Federal Ministry of Family, 
Senior Citizen, Women and Youth <http://www.bmfsfj.de> (last accessed 30 September 2005). 
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This paper believes that civil remedies can be helpful in the first place and will probably 
mostly prevent 'soft' stalkers from carrying out further unwanted behaviour. Nevertheless, it has 
to be examined what happens with the relentless or the unknown perpetrator. Here, the question 
emerges whether a change of criminal law provisions is required. Is the existing law actually 
inadequate? This paper will analyse protection of stalking victims both under German civil and 
criminal law and discuss shortcomings. It will highlight the current attempts on criminalising 
stalking behaviour and some of the new Bill's imperfections in relation to constitutional law. 
1 How are victims protected against stalking under the current legislation in Germany? 
Stalking behaviour can lead to a restraining order carried out by the victim in respect of 
the stalker if the conduct in dispute amounts to civil harassment. This is comparable to the 
proceeding under sections 9 and 16 of the Harassment Act 1997. Stalking behaviour might also 
result in a conviction under criminal law if the stalker is guilty of committing an offence under 
the Penal Code. But it has to be noted that there is, so far, no offence of criminal harassment 
comparable to section 8 of the Harassment Act 1997. 
(a) Protection under the Civil Code 
A victim can file for an injunctive relief on the basis of sections 823 in conjunction with 
1004 of the Civil Code. This requires an unlawful intrusion, already occurred or imminent to 
happen, into a certain right, namely life, bodily integrity, personal liberty or property. An 
application for an injunctive relief on the basis of those sections will not help a stalking victim, if 
the stalker restricts him or herself to disturbing and annoying but still 'legal' actions. 
(b) Protection under the Violence and Harassment Act 
To give greater protection to victims of harassment the Violence and Harassment Act was 
enacted in December 2001 and came into force on 1 January 2002. In addition to the afore 
mentioned procedure under the Civil Code, a victim can now apply for a restraining order under 
section 1 of this Act, if the requirements set out by the relevant sections are met. 
(i) The scope of the Violence and Harassment Act 
In contrast to New Zealand's Domestic Violence Act 1995, the Violence and Harassment 
Act is not limited to domestic relationships.95 Every stalking victim can apply for a court order 
when he or she is being harassed. This possibility of filing for a court order is explicitly 
acknowledged to stalking victims.96 To put it short, the German Violence and Harassment Act 
can be viewed as a mixture of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 and the Harassment Act 1997. 
In relation to stalking - based on the assumption that there has been no criminal offence 
committed by the stalker - section 1 subsection 2(1 )(b) of the Violence and Harassment Act is of 
particular interest. This section stipulates that the court, on application of the victim, has to make 
an order accommodating 'required actions ' in respect of a person who 
(1) harasses another person in an unacceptable manner; or 
(2) follows and stalks the person contrary to the other persons explicitly expressed wish; 
or 
(3) makes contact with the person by telephone or any other means of communication. 
Section 1 of the Violence and Harassment Act provides that a German court has to grant 
an order accommodating 'required actions ' if all requirements of this section are met. In contrast 
to section 16 of the Harassment Act 1997, which vests New Zealand courts with an overall 
discretion regarding restraining orders, there is no discretion on the question whether to grant an 
order. If the victim applies for it and the prerequisites of the relevant sections are met, it has to be 
granted. 
The 'required action' taken by the court to protect the victim will most often be an 
injunction prohibiting the stalker any contact whatsoever with the victim as well as a non-
molestation order. It has to be observed that an injunction will only be granted if the stalker' s 
behaviour is deemed 'unacceptable' by the court as this is a prerequisite of the relevant section. 
A definition of unacceptable behaviour is not given but section 1(2)(2) defines that a person's 
95 Dieter Schwab "2002 - Ein Jahr fur Juristen" (2002) 1 FamRZ 2. 
96 Otto Palandt and Dieter Bassenge Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (64ed, C H Beck, Miinchen, 2005) Section 1 
GewSchG 8 
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conduct will not result in a court order while performing a 'legitimate interest' that results in 
contact to the other person. The term 'legitimate interest' itself is not defined either and it lies 
with the discretion of the court to establish a workable definition. Here, the immanent problem of 
all anti-stalking legislation shows: undefined legal terms that have to be interpreted by the courts. 
It is completely in the discretion of the courts to establish whether the harassment was conducted 
in an 'unacceptable manner'. This paper believes that the legislature should at least have given 
some guidelines on interpretation. The German courts established that, for example, contact with 
joint custody children might constitute a legitimate interest. 97 
Similar to the New Zealand Harassment Act 1997, the German Act makes it an offence to 
contravene a court order.98 A person contravening the court order is liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding one year or a fine. The section also establishes that the perpetrator might still 
be criminally liable if he or she additionally commits any criminal offences. A form of 
'aggravated' contravention similar to section 25(3) of the Harassment Act 1997, however, does 
not exist. 
(ii) Did the enactment of the Violence and Harassment Act produce better protection for 
victims? 
Without doubt, the Violence and Harassment Act is of great use when it comes to fighting 
stalking behaviour. But it has to be observed that there are many difficulties inherent in civil 
remedies. One of the main problems is that, as with any civil remedy, the victim has to start 
proceedings and has the onus of proof.99 A survey, conducted by the German Federal Ministry of 
Justice in cooperation with the Institute of Family Research at the University of Bamberg, 
evaluated the benefits and downsides of the new Violence and Harassment Act. 100 Experts were 
97 Otto Palandt and Dieter Bassenge Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (64ed, C H Beck, Miinchen, 2005) Section I 
GewSchG 8. 
98 S 4 Violence and Harassment Act. 
99 Bjorn Kerbein and Philipp Probsting "Stalking" (2002) 2 ZRP 77. 
100 Marina Rupp "Rechtsstaatliche Untersuchungen zum Gewaltschutzgesetz", Federal Ministry of Justice 
<http://www.bmj.bund.de> (last accessed 16 September 2005). 
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asked to review the recently enacted legislation. 101 In general, they found the obstacles for 
stalking victims to file for a restraining order higher than for a victim of domestic violence. 102 
The question arises why the experts, on the one hand, find the Act being an immense 
legal improvement but, on the other hand, think that the Act does not provide efficient help for 
staking victims. 103 
This paper believes that those practical barriers might arise from the unfamiliarity of 
stalking victims with the Violence and Harassment Act and the fact that they might assume that 
this Act only governs domestic violence. Another point could be the lack of faith in civil 
remedies. Victims might think that - although it is an offence to contravene a restraining order -
a civil remedy might not be as powerful as a criminal conviction. This paper argues that the main 
concern emerges from the fact that the onus of proof is with the victim. It will be difficult for the 
victim to prove that another person is persistently harassing the victim against the victim's 
explicitly expressed wish. Furthermore, the victim has to make sure that all actions in relation to 
the stalker are observed by a friend or family member so that this person could give evidence 
should there be a court hearing. This paper is of the opinion that those requirement can add to the 
despair of the victim. In addition, police and judges have to be convinced of the relevance of the 
amount of harassment. This paper is of the opinion that psychological stress that might amount to 
injury is still not taken seriously enough. 
A further difficulty is that the victim has to become active in order to be left alone and has 
to find a lawyer in order to file for a restraining order. A provision resembling section 13 
Harassment Act 1997, which allows applications on behalf of victims under certain 
circumstances, does not exist under Gennan law. Therefore, the victim might be unable to start 
proceedings because of fear of harm from the stalker. This paper is in favour of the possibility of 
applying on behalf of certain persons and proposes the insertion of a similar clause into the 
Violence and Harassment Act. It is argued that this would acknowledge the fear and mental 
distress a stalking victim is put through by enduring stalking behaviour for a long time. 
101 The survey included judges, lawyers, police, bailiffs, staff at outreach clinics and women's refuges. 
102 Marina Rupp "Rechtsstaatliche Untersuchungen zum Gewaltschutzgesetz" 304, Federal Ministry of Justice 
<http://www.bmj.bund.de> (last accessed 16 September 2005). 
103 Marina Rupp "Rechtsstaatliche Untersuchungen zum Gewaltschutzgesetz" 311 , Federal Ministry of Justice 
<http://www.bmj .bund.de> (last accessed 16 September 2005). 
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Moreover, it could guarantee that perpetrators could be accused of civil harassment and face the 
consequences of their wrongdoing. 
Another shortcoming of civil remedies in general is that under German law a restraining 
order always has to be enforced by the victim. The victim and the lawyer respectively is 
responsible for serving the restraining order to the perpetrator. Here, it shows that a restraining 
order is of little use when the victim is being stalked by an anonymous perpetrator. The victim, or 
another person on behalf of the victim, would have to investigate the stalker's identity in order to 
be able to file an application with the court. 
It is submitted that, although not flawless, the Violence and Harassment Act is a very 
helpful improvement of German civil law. Nevertheless, its scope is not as broad as the one 
stipulated in the Harassment Act 1997 as the German Violence and Harassment Act merely seeks 
to complement existing legislation. It should be reviewed using the findings of the survey 
conducted by the German Federal Ministry of Justice in cooperation with the Institute of Family 
Research at the University of Bamberg. 
( c) Protection under the Criminal Code 
Criminal law provides some protection for stalking victims. Under current law, a stalker 
can violate several provisions ranging from bodily harm, coercion, threatening conduct or 
trespass for example. Mostly, however, stalking conduct will be just below the legal 
requirements of an offence like this and the prosecutor will therefore not be able to charge the 
stalker with illegal conduct. 
The benefit of criminal proceedings for the victim is the fact that, in contrast to civil 
proceedings, they are conducted by the prosecutor ex officio. The victim does not need to 
provide evidence and find out about the identity of an anonymous stalker but only has to testify 
during court proceedings. Then again, the cardinal impairment of criminal law, not only the 
German criminal law, lies in the fact that the stalker must 'do something', such as physically 
attack the victim, before the law will strongly intervene. 104 Before this happens, victims might 
104 Robert A Guy "The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws" (1993) 46 Vand L Rev 999. 
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feel helpless and think the criminal system has failed them. Although German police are 
compelled to intervene if a victim explains and proves fear of severe bodily harm or even death, 
stalking is still a phenomenon which is not taken seriously, because the grave effects this conduct 
has on the victim are commonly unknown or underestimated. When reporting harassing 
behaviour to the police, officers might sometimes assume the victim is over-sensitive and simply 
over-reacting to certain behaviour. 
This paper holds the opinion that law enforcement authorities need to be trained on the 
topic of stalking in order to take it more seriously and be aware of individually occurring and 
common offences such as trespass in the context of the complex situation. Changes, though, are 
taking place, albeit slowly. In the city of Bremen, for example, the police have established a 
'stalking representative'. 105 This representative's aim is to sharpen the awareness of police 
officers towards stalking behaviour by training them on this topic and explaining about the 
phenomenon of stalking, its impact on the victim and the remedies offered under current law. 
Also, raising the public awareness is focussed on. The 'stalking representative' organises 
information sessions and law clinics and distributes information leaflets. This paper highly 
appreciates training of people in contact with stalking behaviour like police officers. It is 
believed that a law, perfectly elaborated and drafted, will be of no use if the people applying it 
are not trained to detect the offence and do not take victims seriously. 
2 Is existing law inadequate and are legislative changes needed? 
Given the above facts, this paper holds the opinion that existing laws are in fact 
inadequate in combating the problem of stalking. Because of the aforementioned shortcomings, 
civil remedies alone are not sufficient and restraining orders might not discourage all stalkers 
from stopping their behaviour. In some cases a restraining order might even be seen as an 
incentive by perpetrators to intensify their behaviour. Criminal law as well cannot cover the 
complex behaviour of stalking because it merely focuses on single acts and does not recognise 
stalking as an offence on its own. Moreover, single acts in context of stalking conduct will 
mostly be just below the constituting legal requirements of an offence. 
105 Police Bremen <http://www.polizei.bremen.de> (last accessed 30 September 2005). 
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In this context, the question arises whether criminalising stalking behaviour is an option 
to better protect victims from the most serious forms of harassment. This paper argues in favour 
of criminalising stalking behaviour in Germany. Picture yourself being send flowers every day, 
finding love letters at all different places and being watched while shopping for groceries or 
sitting in a pub. One can illustrate a stalking scenario in a more drastic way, so how about being 
send a swimsuit stained in the crotch area with seminal fluid or a letter full of bullets? 106 Should 
behaviour like this violate criminal law? As stated above, this paper believes that inserting a 
provision into the German Penal Code, similar to New Zealand's section 8 of the Harassment Act 
1997, is of vital importance. As in New Zealand, only the most serious types of harassment 
should be covered by a new provision. 
3 Acknowledging a gap in the legal protection of stalking victims 
The German Bundesrat first acknowledged the law was not able to cope with stalking 
behaviour and persistent harassment in March 2004. Almost all politicians recognised that 
adopting a criminal provision is vital to provide adequate legal protection for all victims of 
harassment and stalking. 107 The Minister of Justice, Brigitte Zypries, stated that existing 
protection under the Violence and Harassment Act has to be improved. 108 After extensive debates 
a new Bill was introduced to the Bundestag. 109 The aim of this bill is to introduce a new section 
into the Penal Code that makes persistent harassment an offence. 
4 Objections against the anti-stalking Bill 
Constitutional principles are most important when drafting a criminal statute. Adhering to 
those principles is vital for democracy and a constitutional state. Furthermore, it is essential for 
criminal statues to be certain and define a scope of application so that every citizen can tell right 
106 Example taken from R A Swanwick ,,Stalkees Strike Back - the Stalkers Stalked: A Review of the First Two 
Years of Stalking Legislation in Queensland"(l996) 19 QUTLJ 34. 
107 Bundesrat, Plenarprotokoll of 18 March 2005, Sitzung 809, Tagesordnungspunkt 16, Dokumentations- und 
Informationssystem fur Parlamentarische Vorgiinge <http://dip.bundestag.de> (last accessed 30 September 2005). 
108 Federal Ministry of Justice <http://www.bmj.de> (last accessed 24 September 2005). 
109Bundesrats-Drucksache 551/04 of 5 July 2004, "Bill on the Amendment of the Penal Code regarding persistent 
Harassment" Dokumentations- und Informationssystem fur Parlamentarische Vorgiinge <http://dip.bundestag.de> 
(last accessed 30 September 2005). 
40 
from wrong. The drafting of stalking statues can challenge these principles, leaving it with the 
legislature to formulate a coherent statute. 
The new Bill seeks to criminalise stalking behaviour. This aim is to be achieved by 
inserting the new clause 241 b into the German Penal Code. The proposed clause seeks to outlaw 
every person's persistent and unwarranted harassment against another person's when the first 
person engages in the following specified acts: 
(1) following, stopping or accosting a person; and 
(2) making contact with that person (whether by telephone or any other means of 
communication); and 
(3) threaten the person or any other third person with whom the person is in a close 
relationship; and 
(4) acting in any other way. 
Those specified acts shall be punishable if they cause the person to fear for his or her life, 
bodily integrity, freedom, or any other object oflegal protection. 
The main objection concerning the new Bill is the phrase under (4) criminalising 'acting 
m any other way' in contrast to the previously defined and specified behaviour. 110 In the 
explanatory statement it is stated that this phrase was introduced to include all possible behaviour 
towards a victim because the perpetrator's terror is only limited by his or her imagination. 111 The 
section does not define the term of 'acting in any other way' and in the absence of such 
definition, the issue of uncertainty of criminal law arises. A fundamental principle of German 
criminal law is the requirement that all aspects of punishment, including preconditions for 
imposition as well as type and severity, must be defined by statute. 112 This is the so-called 
principle of legality which invariably includes a requirement of statutory definiteness. 113 
110 Bundesrats-Drucksache 551/04 of 5 July 2004, § 241a (1)4, Dokumentations- und Informationssystem fiir 
Parlamentarische Vorgiinge <http://dip.bundestag.de> (last accessed 30 September 2005). 
111 Bundesrats-Drucksache 551/04 of 5 July 2004, 8, Dokumentations- und Informationssystem fiir Parlamentarische 
Vorgiinge <http://dip.bundestag.de> (last accessed 30 September 2005). 
112 Joseph J Darby and Hans-Heinrich Jescheck The Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany (Sweet and 
Maxwell, London 1987) 8. 
113 Joseph J Darby and Hans-Heinrich Jescheck The Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany (Sweet and 
Maxwell, London 1987) 9. 
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Article I 03(2) German Basic Law explicitly stipulates the principle of statutory 
definiteness saying that "an act may be punished only if it was defined by a law as a criminal 
offence before the act was committed." This provision shall ensure that everybody can tell right 
from wrong and that the principle of nulla poene sine Lege, meaning 'no punishment without an 
underlying provision outlawing this behaviour', is strictly observed. 
As mentioned before, the Federal Constitutional Court has the power to abrogate a statute 
deemed to be unconstitutional and can also examine this power if it considers a statute to be 
uncertain. It held that the principle of statutory definiteness imposes a special prohibition of 
arbitrariness onto the legislature and constitutes an obligation to formulate the scope of a 
criminal statute in such a precise manner that every citizen will know whether a conduct is legal 
or illegal. 114 Of course, this does not produce an absolute obligation to specify and/or precisely 
describe every single word and fact of criminal behaviour, as this would not be possible. 115 
Because statues have to address all different kinds of facts, they cannot be drafted exactly to fit 
the one individual case. 
Bearing the principle of statutory definiteness in mind, this paper believes that the new 
anti-stalking Bill suffers significant shortcomings in relation to constitutional law. Is it really 
necessary to cover all possible behaviour and include subclause (4)? It is submitted that this 
'broadbrush' definition of stalking behaviour will violate constitutional principles set out under 
the Basic Law as well as the principle that criminal law should always be used as a last resort. 
(a) Criminal law as the last resort - The principle of ultima ratio 
When general principals of law are at stake, the legislature's attempts to create a penalty 
for stalking behaviour have to be well considered. Attempts to find a legal definition of stalking 
will inevitably encounter obstacles as a great deal of commonly occurring stalking behaviour is 
also commonplace in the course of legitimate social interaction between citizens. 116 This 
114Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Consititutional Court), Beschluss of 12 December 2000 - 2 BvR 1290/99 
<http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de> (last accessed 21 September 2005). 
115 Hans D Jarass and Bodo Pieroth Grundgesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and (7ed, C H Beck, Miinchen 
2004) Article 103, 48. 
116 Emily Finch "Stalking the perfect Stalking Law: An Evaluation of the Efficiency of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997" (2002) Sep CRIMLR 705. 
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difficulty has to be taken into account when drafting a new law and the question is to be raised 
where the line that divides the acceptable pursuit of reconciliation with, for example, an ex-
partner and stalking, is to be drawn. The same has to apply to a suitor: can it be legal to call an 
acquaintance twice a day but illegal to do so ten times a day? This paper believes that the major 
problem in combating stalking and drafting criminal anti-stalking provisions is to find a balance 
between conduct considered to be criminal and unwanted, and behaviour that is still 'normal' and 
legally adequate. The legislature should always bear in mind that criminal law is only ultima 
ratio in combating socially unwanted conduct. This paper contends that this leads to the 
presumption that the concept of criminal law must always be a fragmentary one. If the German 
legislature, however, decides to criminalise stalking behaviour it has to be made sure that this 
will only be for the most serious forms of stalking and harassment. 
(b) Violation of general criminal law principles - The principle of definiteness 
As stated above, the principle of definiteness is of vital importance in criminal law. 
Statutes always have to fulfil the requirements of definiteness in order to allow the perpetrator to 
know whether his or her behaviour is illegal. 
Due to difficulties in proving intent, several US American jurisdictions, for example, have 
adopted a minimum level of intent. 117 Under these jurisdictions it is only necessary to prove that 
the perpetrator committed the act that caused the victim to fear while no proof is required that the 
perpetrator actually intended to cause fear or alarm. A statue like this is a victim-defined 
crime. 118 This paper argues that this legislative concept disregards the principle of predictability 
of criminal behaviour as well as the principle of definiteness. 
To constitute a valid statute under criminal law, it is necessary that a person knows 
exactly which conduct is deemed to be legal and which, in contrast, is considered to be illegal 
and will be punished. People might otherwise not be on notice that their behaviour constitutes a 
crime. It will hardly be possible to assess a person's prosecution and criminal responsibility when 
117 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 258. 
118 Paul E Mullen, Michele Pathe and Rosemary Purcell Stalkers and their victims (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 259. 
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it is depending on the mental and physical power of resistance of a victim. The principle of 
certainty is a fundamental maxim of criminal law and can be violated by applying a victim-
defined view of an offence. This paper argues that it is necessary to protect citizens against 
ambiguous criminal laws and provide certainty when drafting a new law. This requires 
legislatures to define criminal behaviour sufficiently to put a potential offender on notice that a 
certain conduct is prohibited. 119 
How do these principles affect the new anti-stalking Bill? This paper is of the opinion that 
subclause ( 4) of the new Bill violates the principles of definiteness. Of course, it is not possible 
for the legislature to think of all potential cases that might arise and draft a statute to cover all 
this conduct. While this paper is strongly in favour of a criminal anti-stalking legislation, it 
suggests that the imprecise wording referring to 'acting in any other way' should be omitted in 
order to comply with constitutional principles. As in the United States, no state includes all of the 
provisions necessary to comprehensively address stalking behaviour and their effects. 120 This 
might be sometimes seen as insufficient but this paper holds the opinion that constitutional 
principles shall prevail over a general criminal coverage of stalking behaviour. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Stalking behaviour has moved into the focus of law just recently and legislatures in all 
different countries make an effort to combat this behaviour by civil and criminal law means. 
Given the immense impact stalking behaviour can have on the victims the improvement of legal 
protection is of vital importance. Although improving legal protection against stalking behaviour 
is highly favourable, the legislature has to accurately assess the affected rights of both victim and 
perpetrator and balance them sufficiently. 
The question to ask in context of criminalising stalking behaviour must always be 
whether certain behaviour justifies the restriction of rights or not. Balancing rights is of course 
the underlying principle of every law, especially criminal law. Here, Governmental policy 
decisions play a major role. The questions arising are what should be protected and to what 
119 M Katherine Boychuk ,,Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?" ( 1994) NwULRev 773. 
12° Kathleen G Mc Ananey and C Elizabeth Abeyta-Price "From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Law'' (1993) 
68 NTDLR 906. 
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extent? Is there any behaviour that can be decriminalised and what behaviour has to be 
criminalised? Not every kind of behaviour in the context of stalking can be seen as so serious that 
it might infringe the rights of the victim to that extent that it is justified to restrict the 
perpetrator's constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms. The principle of proportionality 
has to be strictly observed by the legislature. Legislation has to reconcile competing rights with 
each other. It is of vital importance to understand that the state cannot legislate for every single 
act of human life and interaction. A society certainly has to keep up with the downsides of the 
human nature. Some behaviour might be annoying or disturbing but this does not mean that 
Government should intervene by enacting new laws. 
This paper believes that the Harassment Act 1997 finds a good balance between 
competing rights of victim and perpetrator. Nevertheless, this paper is in favour of reviewing the 
provision on criminal harassment as it regards the constituents of section 8(1)(b) of the 
Harassment Act 1997 problematic and not well defined. Problems arising from the lack of a clear 
definition have been vividly demonstrated in the case of R v D where innocent behaviour led to a 
criminal conviction. 
Protection for stalking victims under German law has to be extended as the current 
legislation under civil and criminal law is not sufficiently catering for the needs of the victims. 
Introducing the new Bill on criminalising stalking behaviour is a step in the right direction 
although this Bill has to be revised in order to comply with the Basic Law. Then, adequate legal 
protection will be available for stalking victims similar as it already exists in New Zealand. 
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